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MILITARY LAW - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF COURTS MARTIAL -
AMENABILITY OF DISCHARGED SERVICEMAN TO JURISDICTION OF COURT MARTIAL
FOR CRIME COMMITTED DURING MILITARY SERvcE.-Petitioner, an honorably
discharged serviceman, was arrested on May 13, 1953 at Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania by Military Police and transported to Korea on a charge of having
committed murder there while a member of the Armed Forces. He sought
release from confinement and return to this country through a petition for
habeas corpus addressed to the United States District Court in Washington,
D. C., naming the Secretary of the Army as defendant. Held, petition for
habeas corpus granted. The procedure followed in arresting petitioner was
not authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' While the Code
specifies that a military court may exercise jurisdiction over a discharged
serviceman who has committed crimes punishable by imprisonment for five
years or more and cannot be tried in the regular federal courts, it does not
establish any procedure for transferring the serviceman back to a military
status. Since the method used in petitioner's case deprived him of such rights
as arraignment before a United States Commissioner, his confinement and
arrest were illegal. Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D.C. 1953).
It is the general nide that a person is amenable to military jurisdiction only
during the period of his service as a soldier or officer, and that when dis-
charged in any recognized legal mode of separation from the service, he ceases
to possess a military status and becomes a civilian; thus such jurisdiction can
constitutionally no more be exercised over him than it could before he entered
the armed forces.2 Although a punishable crime has been committed, even the
most patently guilty person may be so adjudged only in a proceeding where he
is accorded all rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed him by the
Constitution. 3 To insure this guarantee, only the court, either military or
civil, that has jurisdiction over the offender can legally try him 4 because the
Fifth Amendment clearly distinguishes the military from the civilian class as
separate communities and recognizes no third class consisting of one half
army and one half civilian.5
Since the military court did have jurisdiction at one time but did not
exercise it, does military jurisdiction extend to the person after he becomes a
civilian? It has been suggested that an affirmative answer to this question
is inconsistent with the supremacy of civil over military law, and hence
unconstitutional.6 The instant case raised this question but it was not decided
because of the lack of any procedure for subjecting civilians to military courts
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Thus the question is still unanswered.
1. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 3(a) (1951).
2. E.g., United States v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920); Ex Porte
Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1946); Cf. Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F.2d 288
(5th Cir. 1949); Ex Parte Goldstein, 268 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
3. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S." 219 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
4. Winthrop, Military Law and Prededents 85 (2d ed. 1920) (military jurisdiction
extends from the time of entering the service by acceptance of appointment or commission,
or by enlistment or muster in, and the time of leaving it by resignation, dismissal,
discharge or death).
5. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 106 (2d ed, 1920).
6. See Ex Parte McRoberts, 16 With. 600 (Iowa 1864) "... .. under our Federal
Constitution, rightful supremacy of civil over military authority is well outlined."
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A leading case 7 held, regarding military offenders in general, that if military
jurisdiction has attached prior to legal termination of service, the offender
may be tried by court martial after that date, discharge being withheld. And
where military jurisdiction has once attached by arrest or charges before dis-
charge, termination of a person's military status does not deprive the military
of jurisdiction already acquired over the person. 8
Since court martial jurisdiction includes not only the power to hear and
determine a case, but also the power to execute and enforce the sentence,9
the offender can be retained by or returned to military jurisdiction from civilian,
for all purposes of trial, judgment and execution provided action was started
against him before his discharge.1o However, in the past it has been held
that this is not so if court martial proceedings are begun after discharge,11 nor
is the rule applicable to inactive reservists since they cannot be called into
active duty merely to be tried for an offence committed during their previous
active duty time.
12
Court Martial Boards are lawful tribunals with authority to finally determine
any case over which they have jurisdiction. Their proceedings, when confirmed
as provided, are not open to review by civil tribunals except for purposes of
ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and
subject matter, and whether though having such jurisdiction, it exceeded its
powers in the sentence pronounced.13 The military must meet the test of
jurisdiction over the accused before they can try a civilian.14 In view of the
foregoing the accused does have a means of guaranteeing his right in that
he can petition for a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether there was a
deprivation of a constitutional right.1
5
The Federal Constitution provides for supremacy of the civilian authority
over the military powers at all times.1 6 The Uniform Code of Military Justice,
nevertheless, gives the military the power to arrest a civilian, formerly a
military offender, and court martial him. Although the constitutionality of
Article 3 (a) of the Code has not been tested, is this not a violation of our
Federal Constitution and our democratic government? It is contended that
7. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 383 (1902) "The accused was proceeded against
as an officer of the Army, and jurisdiction attached in respect of him as such, which
included not only the power to hear and determine the case, but the power to execute,
and enforce the sentence of the law . . . He was a military prisoner though he had ceased
to be a soldier; and for offences committed during his confinement he was liable to trial
and punishment by court martial under the rules and articles of war."
8. Barrett v. Hopkins, 7 Fed. 312 (D. Kan. 1881) (term of enlistment expired after
arrest but before trial and conviction).
9. O'Malley v. Hiatt, 74 F. Supp. 44 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
10. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Barrett v. Hopkins, 7 Fed. 312
(D. Kan. 1881).
11. Ex Parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1946); Cf. Hironimus v. Durant,
168 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1948) (service personnel on terminal leave considered on active
duty with jurisdiction over them being retained by the military).
12. United States v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1919); United States v. Mac-
Donald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920); Ex Parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410 (9th Cir.
1946).
13. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S.
365 (1902); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496 (1900).
14. Carter v. Woodring, 67 App. D.C. 393, 92 F.2d 544 (1937).
15. Accord, Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950) (military court judgment is
subject to habeas corpus only after all available remedies under the court-martial system
are exhausted).
16. See note 6 Supra.
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this section would be unconstitutional on the grounds that it permits the
military direct control over a civilian. A possible solution, however, might be
in the establishing of a commissioner's office, whose duty it would be to
regulate the passing of prior military offenders from civilian control back into
military channels, thereby creating harmony between the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and our Federal Constitution.
CLINTON R. OTTMAR
SALES-REMEDIES OF BUYER-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER -70 REIMBURSE
RETAILER FOR DAMAGES PAID TO CONSUMER FOR BREACH OF EXPRESS WAR-
RANTY.-The defendant manufactured a stepladder and sold it to a retailer with
an express warranty of fitness. The retailer resold it to a customer with a
similar warranty. The customer, injured when the stepladder collapsed, sued
the retailer and recovered a sizeable verdict. Although the retailer notified
the defendant of the commencement of the purchaser's suit and demanded
that it take over the defense, the defendant refused. The plaintiff, an insurance
company which reimbursed the retailer for the damages be was compelled to
pay, brought suit against the defendant to recover the sum thus paid.
Held, judgment for plaintiff as a matter of law. Defendant manufacturer,
having been given notice of the pendency of the suit by the customer against
the retailer, was bound by the result in the prior action on the principle of
res judicata. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. J. R. Clark Co., 59 N.W.2d 899
(Minn. 1953).
The underlying rule applied in this case is one which is apparently "well
settled, that where a person is responsible over to another, either by operation
of law or express contract and he is duly notified by the pendency of the suit
against the person to whom he is liable over and full opportunity is afforded
him to defend the action, the judgment, if obtained without fraud or collusion,
will be conclusive against him whether he appears or not." 1 The same principle
has often been applied in cases of warranty of title,2 as well as in negligence
cases. 3 Most of the authorities cited in the instance case involved either cases
of recovery on implied warranties or for negligent manufacture.
4 The holding
is thus not confined to cases involving express warranties.
5
1. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Strait Scales Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W.2d
766 (1929).
2. Goldberg v. Sisseton Loan & Title Co., 24 S.D. 49, 123 N.W. 266 (1909); 3
Williston, Sales §615a (Rev. ed. 1948).
3. Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); Consolidated
Hand-Method Lasting-Mach. Co. v. Bradley, 171 Mass. 127, 50' N.E. 464 (1898).
4. Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 (1886) (implied warranty); Dayton Power &
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 187 Fed. 439 (6th Cir. 1923); Boston
Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901) (implied
warranty); see Pfarr v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 657, 146 N.W. 851, 855 (1914).
5. Reichard, Inc. v. Dunwoody Co., 45 F.Supp. 153 (E.D.Pa. 1942); Aldridge Motors
v. Alexander, 217 N.C. 750, 9 S.E.2d 469 (1940); Gerst v. Jones & Co., 32 Gratt. 518
(Va. 1879) (A manufacturer sold. a grower some tobacco boxes for the grower to pack
his tobacco in. The boxes were green and molded the tobacco, causing the grower to
sell defective goods to his customers. The grower recovered on an implied warranty of
fitness.).
